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We examine the impact of inflation on financial development in Brazil and the data 
available permit us to cover the period between 1985 and 2002. The results – based 
initially on time-series and then on panel time-series data and analysis, and robust for 
different estimators and financial development measures – suggest that inflation 
presented deleterious effects on financial development at the time. The main implication 
of the results is that poor macroeconomic performance has detrimental effects to 
financial development, a variable that is important for affecting, for example, economic 
growth and income inequality. Therefore, low and stable inflation, and all that it 
encompasses, is a necessary first step to achieve a deeper and more active financial 
sector with all its attached benefits. 
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 1 Introduction and Motivation
We investigate the role of in￿ ation for ￿nancial development in Brazil using
data covering the period between 1985 to 2002 and ten economically diverse
regions. This period is particularly interesting because it encapsulates two
distinct regimes in terms of macroeconomic performance in Brazil. The
period between 1985 and 1994 covers the time when the rates of in￿ ation
were notoriously high, reaching an astounding 82.18 percent per month in
March 1990. However, from 1995 onwards macroeconomic performance has
consistently improved, with in￿ ation presenting much lower and stable rates
since then.
The evidence, based initially on the time-series variation, and then on the
relatively novel panel time-series data and analysis, indicates that in￿ ation
is detrimental to ￿nancial development. The evidence is signi￿cant and
robust for di⁄erent data sets, di⁄erent measures of ￿nancial development
and di⁄erent estimators. The main policy implication of the results is that
the high rates of in￿ ation seen in Brazil in the 1980s and ￿rst half of the
1990s had a clear detrimental e⁄ect to a variable that is known to play an
important role in economic growth and income inequality1. Therefore, low
and stable in￿ ation is a necessary ￿rst step to be pursued in Brazil if it is to
have a deeper and more active ￿nancial sector with all its attached bene￿ts2.
What distinguishes this paper from previous studies is that, ￿rstly, we
use, as suggested by Fischer (1993) and Besley and Burgess (2003), national
data to construct a more disaggregated sub-national data set, which better
pinpoints the importance of in￿ ation on ￿nancial development in a country
so regionally diverse in terms of economic outcomes. Furthermore￿ to carry
out the study, and in addition to the time-series data￿ we take advantage of
the novel panel time-series analysis, which deals with important empirical
issues￿ non-stationarity, heterogeneity bias and between-region dependence
in panels￿ not discussed in the previous empirical studies, to get better
and more informative estimates. Additionally, the use of panel time-series
analysis is particularly important because it does not su⁄er from the usual
criticism applied to cross-sectional data and analysis, i.e. that since a period
of high in￿ ation is normally followed by a period of low in￿ ation, high in￿ a-
1For instance, King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), Beck, Levine, et
al. (2000), and Beck and Levine (2004) report that ￿nancial development has a positive
impact on long-run growth. Moreover, Li, Squire, et al. (1998), Dollar and Kraay (2002),
Clark, Xu, et al. (2003), Bon￿glioli (2005), Bittencourt (2007a), and Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, et al. (2007) report that ￿nancial development reduces inequality.
2Singh (2006), Singh and Cerisola (2006) and Santiso (2006) highlight the importance
of the much improved macroeconomic performance in Latin America in producing better
economic outcomes recently. Moreover, Carvalho and Chamon (2006) suggest that the
growth of real income that took place after the reforms of the 1990s in Brazil has been
severely underestimated for methodological reasons, which reinforces the role of macro-
economic stability on welfare.
2tion￿ s detrimental e⁄ects would be cancelled by low in￿ ation3. Secondly, we
take into consideration the problem of ￿nancial repression seen in Brazil dur-
ing the high-in￿ ation period, and therefore use an extra measure of ￿nancial
development that to some extent accounts for this problem.
All in all, we attempt to ￿ll in a gap in the literature by exploring national
and sub-national data, with time-series and regional variation, from a devel-
oping country that provides a rich ground to study and better understand
the impact of in￿ ation on ￿nancial development. Thus, determining what
causes ￿nancial development in a developing country like Brazil￿ which has
presented historically high inequality and erratic growth rates, and high
rates of in￿ ation for a long period of time￿ is important because ￿nancial
development can have an incremental e⁄ect on growth, and a progressive
e⁄ect on inequality. On the other hand, in￿ ation￿ for its nature in Brazil￿
arises as a natural macroeconomic determinant of ￿nancial development.
Theoretical studies related to what is done here include, Moore (1986),
Choi, Smith, et al. (1996), and Azariadis and Smith (1996). They highlight
the fact that if in￿ ation is high enough, returns on savings are reduced￿
which leads to a reduction in savings and savers alike, the pool of borrowers is
swamped, informational frictions become more severe￿ and therefore credit
becomes scarce in such an economy. In a slightly di⁄erent strand, Schreft
and Smith (1997), Boyd and Smith (1998), Huybens and Smith (1998), and
Huybens and Smith (1999), explore the idea that economies with higher rates
of in￿ ation do not approach or reach the steady state where their capital
stocks would be high, i.e. there are bifurcations and development traps
arise in such economies. Furthermore, these economies obviously present
less e¢ cient ￿nancial markets because of the higher interest rates that follow
high rates of in￿ ation. All the same, the Mundell-Tobin e⁄ect is reversed in
a high-in￿ ation environment4.
On the empirical side, Haslag and Koo (1999), and Boyd, Levine, et al.
(2001), using cross-sectional and panel international data from the 1960s to
early 1990s, report that moderate in￿ ation has a negative impact on ￿nancial
development. Moreover, both studies ￿nd evidence of nonlinearities, i.e.
after a particular threshold￿ 15 percent per year in Boyd, Levine, et al.
(2001)￿ in￿ ation presents only smaller marginal negative e⁄ects on ￿nancial
development. The intuition is that the damage on ￿nancial development is
done at rates of in￿ ation lower than the proposed threshold. Furthermore,
Dehesa, Druck, et al. (2007) use a panel of 120 countries between 1997 and
2004 to report that lower in￿ ation increases the amount of credit in their
3See Bruno and Easterly (1998).
4Somehow related, Acemoglu, Johnson, et al. (2003) argue that distortionary macro-
economic policies, in the role of high in￿ ation in this case, are more likely to be a symptom
of weak institutions used by the ￿ elite￿to expropriate the resources of another group in
society Furthermore, Crowe (2006) argues that macroeconomic stabilisation took so long
to take place in, e.g. Brazil, because the rich have always bene￿ted from high in￿ ation.
3sample. Finally, Zoli (2007) reports that in a panel of emerging European
countries between 1995 and 2006 in￿ ation presents detrimental e⁄ects to
￿nancial development5.
All in all, we highlight the importance of a stable macroeconomic envi-
ronment, with consistent monetary and ￿scal policies, which is attainable
only by the introduction of stronger institutions, which are not easily ma-
nipulated, so that a deeper and more active ￿nancial sector emerges with
all its consequences on crucial variables such as growth and inequality6.
The remainder of this paper has the following structure: Section 2 de-
scribes the data set used, and also presents some correlations and regression
plots of the main variables. Section 3 explains the empirical strategy used
and reports the results. Section 4 concludes the paper: it summarises the
importance of the results and their implications in terms of policy, it ac-
knowledges some limitations in terms of data availability, and it suggests
future work.
2 The Data
2.1 Description of the Data
The data set used comes from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Sta-
tistics (IBGE), which is the Brazilian Census Bureau, the Brazilian Central
Bank (BACEN), and the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA)
￿les. The IPEA is an agency of the Brazilian government that, among other
activities, compiles primary and provides secondary data from a variety of
national and international sources.
This data set covers the period between 1985 and 2002 and ten major
regions, from North to South: ParÆ (PA), CearÆ (CE), Pernambuco (PE),
Bahia (BA), Distrito Federal (DF), Minas Gerais (MG), Rio de Janeiro
(RJ), Sªo Paulo (SP), ParanÆ (PR) and Rio Grande do Sul (RS). To brie￿ y
illustrate the importance of these regions in the national context, they ac-
counted for 74 percent of the total population and 84 percent of the total
gross domestic product in 1995. Moreover, in terms of regional variation,
this data set includes a relatively rich southern region like Sªo Paulo, and
also a region like ParÆ in the poor north of the country, with a gross domes-
tic product equivalent to just 5 percent of the one produced by Sªo Paulo
in 1995.
5In addition, Choi, Smith, et al. (1996) use national data from di⁄erent countries, US,
Chile, Korea and Taiwan, to report that in￿ ation presents a negative impact on stock-
market development.
6Singh (2006) reports that the Brazilian authorities have started to implement sounder
federal and regional ￿scal rules and also in￿ ation targeting from the late 1990s onwards.
Nevertheless, Carstens and JÆcome (2005) report that Brazil still has one of the least
independent central banks in Latin America.
4The data used to construct the measures of ￿nancial development are
from the BACEN￿ s Monthly Bulletin, and IBGE￿ s National Accounts Sys-
tem. The ￿rst annualised monetary aggregate used is m2, and it is de￿ned
as money in circulation in the economy plus current account and savings
deposits in the ￿nancial institutions, or just the liquid liabilities for short.
The second monetary aggregate, m3, is de￿ned as m2 plus other ￿nancial
assets which are more illiquid, but with higher rates of nominal and real
returns than the ones in m2. Moreover, credit to the private sector (credit)
and personal credit (personal) are de￿ned respectively as credit provided
by public and private ￿nancial institutions to ￿rms and to individuals, and
individuals only. These monetary aggregates are de￿ ated by the IBGE￿ s
national index of consumer prices (INPC).
The gross domestic products (GDPs), and ￿nancial domestic products
(FDPs)￿ which account for the gross domestic product of the ￿nancial sector
by region￿ are calculated at market prices and de￿ ated by the IBGE￿ s GDP
implicit de￿ ator.
We can then calculate the ratios m2=GDP, m3=GDP, credit=GDP and
personal=GDP at regional and national levels to obtain M2, M3, CREDIT
and PERSONAL respectively. To calculate these measures at national
level we use the information on the national monetary aggregates over the
national GDPs. However, to construct the regional proxies for ￿nancial de-
velopment we have to take into account the fact that the data on monetary
aggregates are provided only at national level. We therefore use the avail-
able national data on monetary aggregates divided by the regional gross
domestic products, and multiplied by the percentage participation of each
region in the ￿nancial domestic product to construct these regional proxies
for ￿nancial development.
The reason for doing so is that otherwise the most developed regions of
the south would not appear as ￿nancially developed as they actually are.
More speci￿cally, with this weighting, the measures of ￿nancial development
recapture more accurately the regional variation in ￿nancial development
present among the di⁄erent regions of Brazil. For example, the Distrito
Federal, where the federal capital Bras￿lia is located, Sªo Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro, regain their places among the most ￿nancially developed regions
after the weighting. De￿nitions 1 and 2 illustrate the regional (FDit) and
national (FDt) measures of ￿nancial development respectively.
FDit = (mon:aggregatest=GDPit)FDPit; (1)
in which FDPit= FDPi=FDPt, and
FDt = mon:aggregatest=GDPt: (2)
Furthermore, the reason for using M3 in addition to M2 is because
during the high-in￿ ation period Brazil presented the problem of ￿nancial
5repression￿ the government kept the basic nominal interest rates arti￿cially
low, generating with that negative real interest rates￿ and therefore a low
M27. Additionally, the measure PERSONAL captures credit being allo-
cated to individuals who might lack the collateral available to, e.g. ￿rms,
and captured by CREDIT. We therefore believe that these extra measures
provide a more accurate view of ￿nancial development in Brazil at the time
for, ￿rstly, broadening the usual M2 to account for assets that, although less
liquid, would not su⁄er as much from ￿nancial repression and high in￿ ation
for having higher rates of returns, not to mention higher levels of indexation
and less restrictions imposed; and secondly, for narrowing CREDIT to ac-
count for those resources being allocated at a more individual level. All in
all, M2 and M3 measure the overall size or how deep a ￿nancial sector is,
and CREDIT and PERSONAL measure how active in channeling savings
to investors the ￿nancial sector is8.
That said, the data on the rates of in￿ ation (INFL) come from the
IBGE￿ s regional consumer price indexes (IPCs) and the national INPC. The
IPCs cover the already mentioned ten regions. This regional information is
then compiled and aggregated by the IBGE, using the resident population
in each region as weight, to form the national INPC itself9.
The macroeconomic control variables used are the regional government
expenditure over the regional GDPs (GOV ), and the regional ￿nancial do-
mestic product (FDP), which accounts for the gross domestic product of the
￿nancial sector in each region. GOV encapsulates all expenditure on cur-
rent public services provided, including education and health, by regional
governments. The expenditure by the regional governments is de￿ ated by
the IBGE￿ s INPC and the data come from the IPEA ￿les.
2.2 Behaviour of the Data
The rates of in￿ ation were notoriously high during the 1980s and ￿rst half of
the 1990s in Brazil. The two most visible hyperin￿ ationary bursts happened
in 1989-1990￿ 1,863 percent in 1989, and 82 percent in March 1990￿ and
then again in 1994, 2,489 percent in 1993. However, after July 1994, with
the implementation of the Real Plan, in￿ ation has been consistently stable
and much lower than previously10.
About ￿nancial development, it can be said that all measures presented
sharp reductions right before, during and after the ￿rst hyperin￿ ationary
7AgØnor and Montiel (1999), and Easterly (2002), cover the issue of ￿nancial repression
in developing countries in general.
8For more on ￿nancial development measures, see Beck, Demirg￿c ￿-Kunt and Levine
(2001).
9For more on these price indexes, see Corseuil and Foguel (2002).
10The Real Plan was gradually implemented during the ￿rst half of 1994. The Real
(R$) itself was introduced in July 1994. See AgØnor and Montiel (1999).
6burst of 1989-1990￿ and then again, although less sharply than before￿
during and after the second burst of hyperin￿ ation in 1993-1994. On the
other hand, after the stabilisation of 1994-1995, all measures have experi-
enced a constant increase in size. Figure 1 illustrates the above using the
national time-series variation in the data.
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Figure 1: In￿ ation and Financial Development, 1985-2002. Source: IBGE, BACEN,
IPEA and author￿ s own calculations. INFL accounts for in￿ ation and the measures of
￿nancial development are M2, M3, private credit (CREDIT) and personal credit (PER-
SONAL).
7Moreover, Table 1 provides the correlations between the measures of ￿-
nancial development and in￿ ation using the national time-series variation
in the data. Firstly, it is seen that all measures of ￿nancial development
are positively correlated with each other and all correlations are statisti-
cally signi￿cant at the 5 percent level. Secondly, all measures are negatively
correlated with in￿ ation, with CREDIT, PERSONAL and M3 being sig-
ni￿cant at the 5 percent level, and M2 being signi￿cant at the 10 percent
level. It is worth mentioning that CREDIT and PERSONAL present
sizeable negative correlations with the rates of in￿ ation. This highlights the
importance of in￿ ation in a⁄ecting those measures that provide funds to be
invested in long-gestation projects such as education and physical capital,
and, e.g. self-employment activities that in general take place in the short
run in developing countries. No less important is the e⁄ect of in￿ ation on
M3, a measure more associated with the provision of indexed assets and
that by its nature would provide some insulation against high in￿ ation via
a process of ￿nancial adaptation during a crisis.
Table 1: Correlation Matrix, Financial Development and In￿ ation, 1985-
2002.
Variables M2 M3 CREDIT PERSONAL INFL
M2 1
M3 .983** 1
CREDIT .596** .691** 1
PERSONAL .857** .853** .648** 1
INFL -.481* -.505** -.635** -.664** 1
Source: BACEN, IBGE, IPEA and author￿ s own calculations. ** signi￿cant at the 5
percent level, and * signi￿cant at the 10 percent level.
Additionally, we run univariate OLS time-series regressions based on the
national data to further investigate the statistical and economic relationship
seen between in￿ ation and ￿nancial development. Figure 2 shows how the
four measures of ￿nancial development fared against in￿ ation, and the clear
and statistically signi￿cant results from these regressions are that in￿ ation
presents a clear negative e⁄ect on all measures of ￿nancial development.
Moreover, it is important to mention the e⁄ect of in￿ ation on M3, since it
presents larger estimates than M2￿ which highlights that a measure that, in
principle, would not su⁄er as much from high in￿ ation and ￿nancial repres-
sion for encapsulating assets which present higher nominal and real returns
than the ones provided by M2 and less imposed restrictions￿ is in fact af-
fected by the high rates of in￿ ation seen at the time. This is particularly
worrying because during crisis￿ in which a process of ￿nancial adaptation
would take place for those with access to ￿nancial markets￿ M3 would be
the monetary aggregate presenting the public assets with more instruments
8of deferring payment, i.e. a reduction in M3 would deprive the general
public of an important tool against high in￿ ation11.
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Figure 2: OLS Regression Lines, Financial Development and In￿ ation, 1985-2002.
Source: BACEN, IBGE, IPEA and author￿ s own calculations. INFL accounts for in-
￿ ation and the measures of ￿nancial development are M2, M3, private credit (CREDIT)
and personal credit (PERSONAL). All estimates are statistically signi￿cant at the 5 per-
cent level.
11For more on ￿nancial adaptation and velocity of money, see Erosa and Ventura (2002),
and Moore (1986).
9In summary, ￿rstly, the above preliminary visual evidence brie￿ y illus-
trates the behaviour of the national time-series data during the period, par-
ticularly the fact that during the hyperin￿ ationary periods the measures of
￿nancial development presented considerable reductions. This shows that
macroeconomic uncertainty, caused mainly by high rates of in￿ ation, is detri-
mental to ￿nancial development. More intuitively, the high in￿ ation seen
between 1985 and 1994 created a clear sense of uncertainty in terms of ex-
pectations of a drastic disin￿ ationary policy that would come at some point
with all its costs12. This uncertainty, combined with the restrictive stabil-
isation plans themselves, played a central role in reducing the amount of
￿nancial resources available in the economy at the time.
On the other hand, the shorter visual evidence covering the period be-
tween 1995 and 2002 suggests that ￿nancial development presented a clear
increase at the time, which points to the importance of a stable macroeco-
nomic environment for a deeper and more active ￿nancial sector, and hence
for higher savings and credit in the economy. However, since the series are
shorter, this e⁄ect is still not being picked up by the initial correlation nor
regression analyses.
Secondly￿ and complementary to the above￿ the statistical correlations
among the variables indicate a signi￿cant negative statistical relationship
between in￿ ation and ￿nancial development. Furthermore, the univariate
OLS time-series regressions to a large extent con￿rm the visual and de-
scriptive evidence presented, and suggest that there is a negative economic
relationship between in￿ ation and ￿nancial development in Brazil.
3 Empirical Strategy and Results
3.1 Strategy
The data set we explore in this Section presents time-series combined with
panel variation. The time series consists of T = 18 years, and the panel
of N = 10 regions covering the period between 1985 and 2002. Therefore
the empirical strategy used is based on the relatively novel panel time-series
T ￿ N analysis. This sort of analysis allows us to deal with issues such
as non-stationarity, heterogeneous bias and between-region dependence in
panels.
For non-stationarity in the regional time series we use the Im, Pesaran
and Shin [IPS (2003)] test, which allows for heterogeneous parameters and
12For instance, the Collor Plan implemented in 1990 was not only a stabilisation attempt
based on restrictive monetary policies, but it also con￿scated a huge fraction of ￿nancial
assets in the economy. Furthermore, the Cruzado Plan implemented in 1986 relied heavily
on interventionist price controls to curb high in￿ ation. It is therefore thought that both
plans only added to the macroeconomic uncertainty at the time. See AgØnor and Montiel
(1999) or Kiguel and Liviatan (1992) for more on these plans.
10serial correlation and for su¢ ciently large T converges in probability to a
standard normal distribution13. The IPS test is based on an Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression for each region of each variable, which are
then averaged. The moments of the mean E and variance var of the average
￿ t to be plugged into the IPS test are taken from IPS (2003) and in this case
are -1.349 and .565 respectively. Equations 3 and 4 illustrate the regional




￿ij￿yi;t￿j+￿it + uit; (3)
IPS =
p




in which ￿i is the heterogeneous intercept, ￿it the time trend, uit the resid-
uals and N the number of regions.
When dynamic models are estimated, the Fixed-E⁄ects (FE) estimator
provides consistent estimates when T ! 1 and N is ￿xed, but only when
the slopes are homogeneous. When heterogeneous slopes are present, the es-
timates provided by the FE estimator become inconsistent, even for large T.
Basically, the xs will not be independent of the lagged y. The indiscriminate
use of the FE estimator in this case is to be seen with caution, since it con-
tains a heterogeneity bias problem, and this bias might be severe. However,
the Random Coe¢ cients (RC) estimator proposed by Swamy (1970), which
allows for heterogeneous intercepts and slopes, gives consistent estimates of
the expected values. The RC, which can also be interpreted as a Generalised
Least Squares (GLS) estimator, consists of a weighted average of ^ ￿i and ^ ￿i,
and the weight contains a modi￿ed variance-covariance matrix of the het-
erogeneous ￿i and ￿i
14. Equation 5 illustrates the dynamic heterogeneous
equation estimated.
FDit = ￿i + ￿iINFLit + ￿iGOVit + ￿iFDPit + ￿FDit￿1 + uit; (5)
in which FDit is the particular measure of ￿nancial development being es-
13An alternative to IPS (2003) is the test by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). However, this
test assumes parameter homogeneity, and therefore does not consider a possible hetero-
geneity bias present in the data.
14An alternative to the RC-GLS is the Mean Group estimator (MG), which consists of
a simple average of the time-series estimates. However, the MG is sensitive to outliers,
a problem not faced by the RC-GLS estimator. A second alternative is the Instrumental
Variable estimator, however an instrument uncorrelated with the residuals is uncorrelated
with the explanatory variable, and therefore not a valid instrument. See Pesaran and
Smith (1995) for more on heterogeneity bias in dynamic panels, or alternatively Smith
and Fuertes (2007). Moreover, GMM-type estimators are not an option due to over￿tting.
See Bond (2002).
11timated, ￿i the heterogeneous intercept, INFLit the rates of in￿ ation, and
the control variables, i.e. government expenditure (GOVit) and the ￿nancial
gross domestic product (FDPit), and uit the independent normal error term.
The FDit￿1 term is the ￿rst lag of the measure of ￿nancial development be-
ing used. The use of the ￿rst lag of the dependent variable is important,
not only because it accounts for the dynamics of ￿nancial development over
time, but also because it works as a proxy for possible omitted variables.
Moreover, since our data set presents T ￿ N, between-region dependence
is believed to be through the disturbances, i.e. E(uitujt) 6= 0. In this
case, the covariance matrix of the residuals of the time-series regressions can
be estimated and used as a weight so that the between-region dependence
is captured. Therefore the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR-FGLS)
estimator is used, and its estimates are based on the regional time series,
which are in turn weighted by the covariance matrix of the residuals, and
the more correlated the residuals are, the more e¢ cient the SUR-FGLS is15.
Equation 6 illustrates the dynamic equation estimated.
FDt = ￿t + ￿INFLt + ￿GOVt + ￿FDPt + ￿FDit￿1 + ut; (6)
in which all variables account for the regional time series of each variable.
Given the brief review above, it can be said that we deal with the most
important empirical issues facing a data set which presents a long T com-
bined with a shorter N. This is important in itself because dealing with
these issues implies that we are able to deliver better and more informative
estimates. Furthermore, the pooled estimators explore the regional links
present in the data to improve e¢ ciency and to reduce collinearity, and the
SUR-FGLS estimator accounts for excessive between-region dependence in
the data and also disaggregates the analysis so that a more insightful view of
the results can be obtained. This distinction is relevant because, as Phillips
and Sul (2003) point out, if between-region dependence is large, there is little
gain in actually pooling the data, instead of using the time-series variation,
as in SUR-FGLS estimator.
All the same, the panel time-series analysis used provides enough tools
that cater for di⁄erent issues, and also avoids the usual criticism that the
cross-country analysis of this subject tends to su⁄er16.
15An alternative to SUR-FGLS is the Correlated Common E⁄ects Estimator (CCE)
proposed by Pesaran (2006a). However, for CCE to work best N is assumed to be large,
and in our data set N = 10. Furthemore, Kapoor, Kelejian, et al. (2007) propose a FGLS
estimator that also works under the N ! 1 assumption.
16See also Clark (1997) for some of the criticism of cross-sectional analysis from an
economic point of view.
123.2 Results
The IPS statistics suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis of unit
roots in all variables and accept in favour of the alternative that at least one
region of each variable is stationary17. Table 2 reports the results.









The moments of the mean E and variance var of the average ﬂ t are respectively: -1.349
and .565. Source: Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and author￿ s own calculations.
The dynamic equations are estimated by the FE and RC-GLS estimators
respectively. The ￿rst half of Table 3 below reports the estimates provided
by the FE estimator. In￿ ation presents negative e⁄ects on ￿nancial devel-
opment, and most estimates are statistically signi￿cant. The controls GOV
and FDP suggest that regional government expenditure￿ for including ed-
ucation and health￿ is conducive to economic development, and an increase
in FDP leads to more ￿nancial development in the economy. The lags of
the ￿nancial development measures present positive e⁄ects on themselves.
The Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests for homogeneity of intercepts suggest that
we can not accept the null of homogeneity, con￿rming that there are ￿xed
e⁄ects.
The second half of the table presents the estimates provided by the RC-
GLS estimator. The e⁄ects caused by all variables on ￿nancial development
follow the same pattern, i.e. negative e⁄ects of in￿ ation on ￿nancial de-
velopment, and positive e⁄ects caused by GOV and FDP. Moreover, M3
and CREDIT su⁄er particularly large e⁄ects, stressing the importance of
in￿ ation in negatively a⁄ecting a measure that is, by de￿nition, broader
than M2 and would not be much a⁄ected by ￿nancial repression￿ which
highlights that in￿ ation severely curtails the provision of payment-deferring
instruments that play a crucial role during crisis￿ and also reducing the
17Pesaran and Smith (1995), and more fundamentally, Phillips and Moon (1999) ar-
gue that spurious regressions are less of a problem in dynamic panels. This is because
the pooled estimators average over the regions and the noise is severely attenuated, and
therefore the estimates are consistent. Furthermore, Kao, Trapani and Urga (2006), and
Smith and Fuertes (2007) suggest that, under certain conditions, the above result holds
even when between-region dependence is present.
13amount of credit in the economy, with all its deleterious e⁄ects on longer-
and shorter-gestation projects. Furthermore, the LR tests for homogene-
ity of intercepts and slopes suggest that the coe¢ cients are heterogeneous,
which makes the RC-GLS the most appropriate estimator in this dynamic
framework. Table 3 reports the results.
Table 3: Dynamic Estimates of In￿ ation on Financial Development,
1985-2002.
FE
M2 M3 CREDIT PERSONAL
INFL -.300 (-2.04) -.424 (-2.03) -.116 (-.81) -.044 (-2.73)
GOV 2.083 (2.04) 2.466 (1.70) 2.199 (2.49) .330 (3.29)





R2 .89 .90 .93 .89
F test 94.80 102.53 186.65 110.43
LR test 54.89 42.78 12.94 30.68
RC-GLS
INFL -.274 (-1.84) -.397 (-2.14) -.186 (-2.83) -.038 (-1.38)
GOV 1.845 (1.87) 1.749 (1.41) .853 (.64) .447 (4.03)





R2 .69 .72 .65 .83
LR test 189.32 235.00 279.70 299.74
T-ratios in parentheses, number of observations: NT=180. Source: author￿ s own
calculations.
Between-region dependence is dealt with by the SUR-FGLS estimator.
The more disaggregated and weighted dynamic time-series equations con-
￿rm the results provided above by the pooled estimators. The impact of
in￿ ation on M2 and M3 is negative and signi￿cant in almost all regions.
In￿ ation presents larger estimates against M3 than M2, and the regions
most a⁄ected by in￿ ation are the ones located in the more developed south,
i.e. Distrito Federal (DF), Sªo Paulo (SP), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Minas
Gerais (MG), and Rio Grande do Sul (RS). This is quite intuitive because,
although regional in￿ ation follows the same national trend over time, the
richest regions are the ones with more advanced ￿nancial sectors, and there-
fore more prone to be a⁄ected by in￿ ation. On the other hand, the poorest
14regions of the north and northeast do not possess a well-structured ￿nancial
sector to be a⁄ected by in￿ ation. The controls GOV and FDP present the
same sort of positive impact as before on ￿nancial development, with most
estimates being signi￿cant. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests suggest
that we cannot accept the null of independence across regions18. Table 4
reports the results.
18The IPS test reported in Table 2 above assumes the existence of between-region in-
dependence. An alternative that considers the existence of between-region dependence is
proposed by Pesaran (2006b), the cross-section IPS (CIPS) test. However, CIPS assumes
that N > 10 and we have N = 10 in our data set. It is therefore thought that the IPS
test in this case is slightly biased but still informative and the best alternative available.
See Baltagi, Bresson, et al. (2005) for more on panel unit-root tests and between-region
dependence.
15Table 4: Dynamic SUR-FGLS Estimates of In￿ ation on Financial De-
velopment, 1985-2002.
SUR-FGLS
M2 PA CE PE BA DF
INFL -.058 (-2.03) -.289 (-4.74) -.134 (-2.07) -.150 (-2.85) -1.336 (-1.84)
GOV .512 (2.80) .244 (.72) 1.061 (2.28) .757 (1.95) 5.271 (1.57)
FDP .154 (1.18) 1.001 (3.56) .838 (3.22) .495 (2.64) 5.467 (2.49)
M2t￿1 .908 (10.87) .790 (8.24) 1.368 (7.47) .755 (11.33) .555 (3.79)
LM test 253.94
M3
INFL -.076 (-2.03) -.384 (-5.24) -.176 (-2.17) -.142 (-2.27) -1.618 (-1.51)
GOV .768 (3.20) .631 (1.88) 1.650 (2.88) 1.534 (3.18) 7.584 (1.45)
FDP .158 (.95) 1.440 (4.36) 1.261 (3.68) .540 (2.42) 7.291 (2.19)
M3t￿1 .855 (11.47) .754 (10.83) 1.400 (8.07) .739 (12.26) .676 (4.56)
LM test 221.33
M2 MG RJ SP PR RS
INFL -.247 (-5.06) -.680 (-8.71) -.409 (-4.46) -.178 (-2.06) -.165 (-5.11)
GOV -.580 (-2.47) -1.636 (-3.63) -.207 (-.31) 1.832 (2.44) .141 (.37)
FDP .614 (3.54) 1.666 (5.82) 1.158 (3.34) .707 (2.52) .397 (2.05)
M2t￿1 .857 (9.55) .802 (14.82) .875 (8.66) .639 (4.66) 1.036 (23.07)
LM test 253.94
M3
INFL -.368 (-6.36) -1.031 (-10.47) -.571 (-5.46) -.200 (-1.98) -.258 (-6.46)
GOV -1.112 (-3.71) -2.458 (-4.39) -.715 (-1.98) 3.135 (3.56) .372 (.87)
FDP .923 (4.19) 2.687 (7.18) 1.575 (3.72) 1.012 (3.23) .855 (3.52)
M3t￿1 .847 (10.84) .817 (18.76) .854 (9.59) .524 (5.24) .958 (23.03)
LM test 221.33
T-ratios in parentheses, number of observations: NT=180. Source: author￿ s own
calculations.
When the measures used are CREDIT and PERSONAL, the impact
of in￿ ation on ￿nancial development, as we have seen before, is negative and
mostly statistically signi￿cant. The measure CREDIT su⁄ers larger detri-
mental e⁄ects than PERSONAL, and the regions most a⁄ected by in￿ ation
are the ones with better developed ￿nancial sectors in the more developed
south. The controls GOV and FDP con￿rm their roles of being conducive
to ￿nancial development, and most estimates are signi￿cant. The LM tests
reject the null of independence across the regions, therefore suggesting that
the SUR-FGLS is an appropriate estimator in this case. Table 5 reports the
results.
16Table 5: Dynamic SUR-FGLS Estimates of In￿ ation on Financial De-
velopment, 1985-2002.
SUR-FGLS
CREDIT PA CE PE BA DF
INFL -.165 (-3.42) -.150 (-2.19) -.144 (-2.03) -.199 (-2.85) -.122 (-.13)
GOV .025 (.09) 1.459 (4.92) 1.034 (3.08) .956 (2.05) 14.244 (2.54)
FDP .422 (2.03) 1.083 (3.21) .995 (3.35) .966 (3.91) 5.723 (1.72)
CREDITt￿1 .362 (2.90) .603 (6.54) .264 (2.06) .185 (1.27) .686 (4.27)
LM test 187.57
PERSONAL
INFL -.016 (-3.48) -.038 (-2.80) -.015 (-1.67) .000 (.07) -.239 (-3.52)
GOV .062 (1.93) .125 (2.30) .225 (3.87) .387 (4.97) .744 (2.27)
FDP .033 (1.63) .136 (2.28) .073 (2.14) .012 (.33) .321 (1.62)
PERSONALt￿1 .616 (9.00) .877 (9.37) .762 (8.48) .677 (7.56) .509 (5.53)
LM test 176.86
CREDIT MG RJ SP PR RS
INFL -.224 (-3.99) -.729 (-7.54) -.311 (-3.24) -.368 (-4.01) -.215 (-3.39)
GOV .410 (1.40) -.217 (-.42) 1.379 (1.96) .671 (1.37) 1.797 (2.78)
FDP 1.227 (5.70) 3.084 (8.34) 1.701 (4.49) 2.032 (5.92) 1.362 (4.53)
CREDITt￿1 .558 (5.69) .608 (9.58) .611 (5.93) .271 (2.63) .397 (3.72)
LM test 187.57
PERSONAL
INFL -.016 (-1.60) -.067 (-4.57) -.051 (-2.16) -.032 (-2.30) -.031 (-3.29)
GOV .204 (3.71) .142 (1.80) .249 (1.33) .198 (2.28) .041 (.36)
FDP .069 (1.88) .170 (3.46) .122 (1.30) .074 (1.42) .128 (2.66)
PERSONALt￿1 .862 (10.06) .701 (8.70) .776 (7.77) .644 (6.50) .947 (9.90)
LM test 176.86
T-ratios in parentheses, number of observations: NT=180. Source: author￿ s own
calculations.
Given the above evidence, we can say that the impact of in￿ ation on a
range of ￿nancial development measures is negative and statistically signif-
icant. Moreover, the pooled evidence, based on di⁄erent panel estimators,
clearly points to the fact that the measures M3 and CREDIT are the ones
being a⁄ected most by in￿ ation. This is particularly worrying since M3 and
CREDIT include respectively ￿nancial assets that would not be so heavily
a⁄ected by ￿nancial repression, for presenting higher rates of nominal and
real returns and less restrictions￿ and hence higher levels of indexation￿
and therefore important during crisis; and assets that are important for the
formation of capital￿ physical and human￿ in an economy. For example,
using the dynamic RC-GLS estimates of INFL against M3, this measure
17would be reduced in .0040 points per year to every one percent increase in
in￿ ation, which is considerable given the nature of in￿ ation in Brazil until
1994.
Furthermore, the more disaggregated time-series evidence based on SUR-
FGLS not only con￿rms the pooled evidence, but also pinpoints which re-
gions are prone to be more a⁄ected by in￿ ation. It is the more ￿nancially
developed regions which are the ones su⁄ering most with poor macroeco-
nomic performance, therefore depriving the country as a whole of an impor-
tant engine for economic development. For instance, using the SUR-FGLS
estimates of INFL against CREDIT in Sªo Paulo, we can see that this
measure would be reduced in .0031 points per year to every one percent in-
crease in in￿ ation. On the other hand, it can be said that the poorer regions
of the north and the northeast are not so a⁄ected by in￿ ation because they
already have a rather small ￿nancial sector, i.e. there is a smaller marginal
negative e⁄ect of in￿ ation on ￿nancial development in those regions. All the
same￿ although the regional rates of in￿ ation follow a very similar trend
over time￿ the SUR-FGLS estimates provide an insightful analysis into the
fact that in￿ ation a⁄ects regions with di⁄erent levels of development di⁄er-
entially.
All in all, the wide body of evidence presented in this Section is econom-
ically feasible and statistically sound and it con￿rms the one presented in
Section 2 above, which reinforces the signi￿cance of the results.
4 Concluding Remarks
We examined the relationship between in￿ ation and ￿nancial development
in Brazil from 1985 to 2002. The results￿ based on di⁄erent data sets, and
on a range of estimators and ￿nancial development measures￿ suggest that
in￿ ation clearly reduced ￿nancial development in Brazil at the time.
The relevance of understanding the macroeconomic determinants of ￿-
nancial development lies in the fact that a deeper and more active ￿nancial
sector is of crucial importance for key economic variables￿ i.e. economic
growth and income inequality￿ high in the agenda of any developing coun-
try, and in particular Brazil19. Moreover, given the sort of macroeconomic
performance seen at the time in Brazil, in￿ ation arises naturally as a proxy
for macroeconomic performance and, hence as a factor that is to have an
impact on ￿nancial development, and its importance is proved by the results
shown in Sections 2 and 3 above20.
19Schumpeter expertly writes ￿credit is essentially the creation of purchasing power
for the purpose of transferring it to the entrepreneur, but not simply the transfer of
existing purchasing power. The creation of purchasing power characterises, in principle,
the method by which development is carried out in a system with private property and
division of labor￿ , Schumpeter (2005).
20Moreover, De Gregorio (1993), Fischer (1993), Barro (1995), Bullard and Keating
18The importance of the results presented is mainly because we explore
not only the time-series variation, but also the panel time-series dimension
present in the data. We carry out a study based on national and sub-
national data, which, ￿rstly, is believed to more accurately pinpoint the
e⁄ects of in￿ ation on ￿nancial development, and secondly, at least to our
knowledge, is believed to be the ￿rst time that such a study has been done
with Brazilian data.
Furthermore, we employ a range of estimators that deal with the em-
pirical issues present in this sort of T ￿ N data to get better and more
informative estimates. The panel time-series analysis also, ￿rst, avoids the
criticism that the cross-sectional analysis usually su⁄ers, e.g. that periods
of di⁄erent macroeconomic performance end up cancelling each other out,
and second, highlights the advantages of pooling and SUR-FGLS analysis
when the variables are expected to be I(1) and regionally dependent. More-
over, we use ￿nancial development measures that, ￿rstly take into account
the problem of ￿nancial repression, and secondly consider the allocation of
credit at a more individual and disaggregated level.
Complementary to the above, the results con￿rm the theoretical predic-
tion, e.g. Choi, Smith, et al. (1996), and Azariadis and Smith (1996) to
mention a few, that high rates of in￿ ation are detrimental to ￿nancial devel-
opment, and hence reverse the Mundell-Tobin e⁄ect. Furthermore, it also
somehow con￿rms the prediction by Acemoglu, Johnson, et al. (2003) that
a better macroeconomic performance is the result of a better institutional
framework that emerges after democratisation takes place. Coincidentally
enough, Brazil fully democratised in 1989, macroeconomically stabilised in
1994, and ￿nancial development has taken o⁄ since 1995.
Therefore, the main policy implication of the results is that for a devel-
oping country to have a deeper and more active ￿nancial sector with all its
attached bene￿ts, the rates of in￿ ation have to be low and consistently under
control. Poor macroeconomic performance only brings deleterious e⁄ects to
a developing economy, i.e. high inequality, erratic growth, and most impor-
tantly here, a restrictive ￿nancial sector. However, for a ￿nancial sector to
become deeper and more active it is important also to stress the importance
of having stronger institutions, which are not easily controlled by a small
￿ elite￿ .
A word of caution is necessary though. The data on the monetary ag-
gregates is still only provided at national level by the BACEN. Provision of
these sort of data at regional level would certainly bring more ￿ exibility in
(1995), Clark (1997), Barro (1998), Bruno and Easterly (1998), and Fischer (2005) con￿rm
the fact that high in￿ ation outweighs the Mundell-Tobin e⁄ect, and therefore presents a
detrimental e⁄ect to economic growth. Also, Cardoso, Barros, et al. (1995), Barros,
Corseuil, et al. (2000), Ferreira and Litch￿eld (2001), and Bittencourt (2007b) report
that the high rates of in￿ ation seen in Brazil in the 1980s and ￿rst half of the 1990s were
signi￿cantly regressive on income inequality.
19terms of empirical analysis. Having said that, the proxies we construct cap-
ture quite e¢ ciently the regional variation of ￿nancial development in Brazil
and the absence of regional information cannot be an obstacle to conduct
studies in this area. The panel time-series estimates presented in Section 3
mirror the time-series evidence in Section 2. Another interesting develop-
ment in terms of data would be the provision of data on ￿nancial assets at
an individual level. These sort of data would not only make it possible to
disaggregate the information we have at the moment even further, and to
check whether the poor really have access to credit, but also to assess how
well or badly their debts are being repaid.
A natural extension would be the use of an extended data set covering
only the period from 1994 onwards to investigate how the stable economic
environment a⁄ected ￿nancial development, i.e. can the Mundell-Tobin ef-
fect be accepted in Brazil after the stabilisation? Another extension of this
work would be an investigation of how in￿ ation and ￿nancial development
a⁄ected economic growth in Brazil during the troubled 1980s and 1990s. The
main question to be asked would be: did ￿nancial development compensate
for the detrimental e⁄ects of in￿ ation to economic growth? Presumably not,
because as seen above ￿nancial development was signi￿cantly reduced dur-
ing the period of crisis. All in all, the research agenda is rich and the use of
sub-national data is promising to be insightful.
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